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Traditional blockchain systems, such as Ethereum, typically rely on a \emph{single volatile cryptocurrency for transaction fees}. This leads to fluctuating transaction fee prices and limits the flexibility of users' payment options. To…
Agentic payment systems extend delegated action to financial transfers, but scaling them on stablecoin rails in regulated settings requires safeguards that remain effective when humans are not continuously in the loop. We present a…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a central component of decentralized exchanges, yet their equilibrium foundations and microeconomic mechanisms remain incompletely understood. This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium framework for…
The always-available liquidity of automated market makers (AMMs) has been one of the most important catalysts in early cryptocurrency adoption. However, it has become increasingly evident that AMMs in their current form are not viable…
Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stability in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) and study the extend to…
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) lending protocols like Aave v3 rely on over-collateralization to secure loans, yet users frequently face liquidation due to volatile market conditions. Existing risk management tools utilize static health-factor…
Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs:…
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…
We address the liquidation problem arising from the credit risk management in decentralised finance (DeFi) by formulating it as an ergodic optimal control problem. In decentralised derivatives exchanges, liquidation is triggered whenever…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
Stablecoins are one of the most widely capitalized type of cryptocurrency. However, their risks vary significantly according to their design and are often poorly understood. We seek to provide a sound foundation for stablecoin theory, with…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the…
Layer-2 (L2) blockchains inherit Ethereums security guarantees while reducing gas fees. As a result, they are gaining traction among traders at Automated Market Makers (AMMs), sparking debate over whether they contribute to liquidity…
In this paper, we describe a novel agent-based approach for modelling the transaction cost of buying or selling an asset in financial markets, e.g., to liquidate a large position as a result of a margin call to meet financial obligations.…
In this paper, we outline a framework for modeling utility-based blockchain-enabled economic systems using Agent Based Modeling (ABM). Our approach is to model the supply dynamics based on metrics of the cryptoeconomy. We then build…
An algorithmic stablecoin is a type of cryptocurrency managed by algorithms (i.e., smart contracts) to dynamically minimize the volatility of its price relative to a specific form of asset, e.g., US dollar. As algorithmic stablecoins have…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are emerging as a popular decentralised trading platform. In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker. We find approximate closed-form solutions to the control…
We introduce ABIDES, an Agent-Based Interactive Discrete Event Simulation environment. ABIDES is designed from the ground up to support AI agent research in market applications. While simulations are certainly available within trading firms…