Related papers: Horizontal Attacks against ECC: from Simulations t…
Side-channel attacks pose significant challenges to the security of embedded systems, often allowing attackers to circumvent encryption algorithms in minutes compared to the trillions of years required for brute-force attacks. To mitigate…
Today's mobile devices contain densely packaged system-on-chips (SoCs) with multi-core, high-frequency CPUs and complex pipelines. In parallel, sophisticated SoC-assisted security mechanisms have become commonplace for protecting device…
Security in modern RISC-V processors demands more than functional correctness: It requires resilience to side-channel attacks. This paper evaluates the vulnerability of the side channel of the CVA6 RISC-V core by analyzing software-based…
A/B tests, also known as randomized controlled experiments (RCTs), are the gold standard for evaluating the impact of new policies, products, or decisions. However, these tests can be costly in terms of time and resources, potentially…
Inference optimization is a vital technique for deploying LLMs at scale. Compilation is the most widely adopted optimization technique for LLMs. While it assumes semantic equivalence between the original and compiled graphs, we first…
Massive, multi-language, monolithic repositories form the backbone of many modern, complex software systems. To ensure consistent code quality while still allowing fast development cycles, Continuous Integration (CI) is commonly applied.…
Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern…
In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…
Existing power analysis techniques rely on strong adversary models with prior knowledge of the leakage or training data. We introduce side-channel analysis with unsupervised learning (SCAUL) that can recover the secret key without requiring…
A recent advancement in quantum computing shows a quantum advantage of certified randomness on the racetrack processor. This work investigates the execution efficiency of this architecture for general-purpose programs. We first explore the…
Self-interference (SI) is the main obstacle to full-duplex radios. To overcome the SI, researchers have proposed several analog and digital domain self-interference cancellation (SIC) techniques. How well the digital cancellation works…
With the outsourcing of design flow, ensuring the security and trustworthiness of integrated circuits has become more challenging. Among the security threats, IC counterfeiting and recycled ICs have received a lot of attention due to their…
We propose a symbolic execution method for analyzing the safety of software under fault attacks both accurately and efficiently. Fault attacks leverage physically injected hardware faults in an embedded system to break the safety of a…
In this paper we discuss the difficulties of mounting successful attack against crypto implementations when essential information is missing. We start with a detailed description of our attack against our own design, to highlight which…
In the context of adversarial robustness, we make three strongly related contributions. First, we prove that while attacking ReLU classifiers is $\mathit{NP}$-hard, ensuring their robustness at training time is $\Sigma^2_P$-hard (even on a…
Successive interference cancellation (SIC) is based on the idea that some interfering signals may be strong enough to decode in order to be removed from the aggregate received signal and thus boost performance. In this letter, we study the…
To make cryptographic processors more resilient against side-channel attacks, engineers have developed various countermeasures. However, the effectiveness of these countermeasures is often uncertain, as it depends on the complex interplay…
Existing logic-locking attacks are known to successfully decrypt functionally correct key of a locked combinational circuit. It is possible to extend these attacks to real-world Silicon-based Intellectual Properties (IPs, which are…
Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally…
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…