Related papers: Horizontal Attacks against ECC: from Simulations t…
Power Side-Channel (PSC) attacks exploit power consumption patterns to extract sensitive information, posing risks to cryptographic operations crucial for secure systems. Traditional countermeasures, such as masking, face challenges…
Power analysis is a branch of side channel attacks where power consumption data is used as the side channel to attack the system. First using a device like an oscilloscope power traces are collected when the cryptographic device is doing…
With the advancement of technology in the last few decades, leading to the widespread availability of miniaturized sensors and internet-connected things (IoT), security of electronic devices has become a top priority. Side-channel attack…
Information leakage is a significant problem in modern software systems. Information leaks due to side channels are especially hard to detect and analyze. In this paper, we present techniques for automated synthesis of adaptive side-channel…
Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…
Performing a comprehensive side-channel analysis evaluation of small embedded devices is a process known for its variability and complexity. In real-world experimental setups, the results are largely influenced by a huge amount of…
This paper investigates an emerging cache side channel attack defense approach involving the use of hardware performance counters (HPCs). These counters monitor microarchitectural events and analyze statistical deviations to differentiate…
This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during…
HQC is one of the code-based finalists in the last round of the NIST post quantum cryptography standardization process. In this process, security and implementation efficiency are key metrics for the selection of the candidates. A critical…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
This paper presents an analysis of the energy consumption of an extensive number of the optimisations a modern compiler can perform. Using GCC as a test case, we evaluate a set of ten carefully selected benchmarks for five different…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…
Power side-channel (PSC) analysis is pivotal for securing cryptographic hardware. Prior art focused on securing gate-level netlists obtained as-is from chip design automation, neglecting all the complexities and potential side-effects for…
Soft error of exascale application is a challenge problem in modern HPC. In order to quantify an application's resilience and vulnerability, the application-level fault injection method is widely adopted by HPC users. However, it is not…
Modern OOO CPUs have very deep pipelines with large branch misprediction recovery penalties. Speculatively executed instructions on the wrong path can significantly change cache state, depending on speculation levels. Architects often…
While side-channel leakage is traditionally evaluated from a fabricated chip, it is more time-efficient and cost-effective to do so during the design phase of the chip. We present a methodology to rank the gates of a design according to…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Rigorous quantitative evaluation of microarchitectural side channels is challenging for two reasons. First, the processors, attacks, and defenses often exhibit probabilistic behaviors. These probabilistic behaviors arise due to natural…
The confidentiality of trained AI models on edge devices is at risk from side-channel attacks exploiting power and electromagnetic emissions. This paper proposes a novel training methodology to enhance resilience against such threats by…
Detecting weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms is of utmost importance for designing secure information systems. The state-of-the-art soft analytical side-channel attack (SASCA) uses physical leakage information to make probabilistic…