Related papers: Equilibrium master equations for time-inconsistent…
In this paper, both dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection problems and dynamic variance hedging problems are discussed under non-Markovian framework. Explicit closed-loop equilibrium strategies of these problems are respectively…
Stochastic optimization problems often involve data distributions that change in reaction to the decision variables. This is the case for example when members of the population respond to a deployed classifier by manipulating their features…
We consider distributionally robust optimization problems where the uncertainty is modeled via a structured Wasserstein ambiguity set. Specifically, the ambiguity is restricted to product measures $P^{\otimes N}$, where $P$ lies within a…
In this paper, we propose a novel equilibrium solution notion for the time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem. This notion is called the mixed equilibrium solution, which consists of two parts: a…
This paper introduces a class of continuous-time, finite-player stochastic general-sum differential games that admit solutions through an exact linear PDE system. We formulate a distribution planning game utilizing the cross-log-likelihood…
In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games. We show that under appropriate regularity conditions, the mean-field value of the stochastic differential game with exponentiated integral cost…
Complex planning and scheduling problems have long been solved using various optimization or heuristic approaches. In recent years, imitation learning that aims to learn from expert demonstrations has been proposed as a viable alternative…
We consider an infinite horizon portfolio problem with borrowing constraints, in which an agent receives labor income which adjusts to financial market shocks in a path dependent way. This path-dependency is the novelty of the model, and…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
This paper investigates the robust optimal control of sampled-data stochastic systems with multiplicative noise and distributional ambiguity. We consider a class of discrete-time optimal control problems where the controller \emph{jointly}…
We develop a Euclidean path-integral control to characterize optimal firm behavior in an economy governed by Walrasian equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, and non-cooperative Markovian feedback Nash equilibrium. The approach recasts the problem…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
We study a time-inconsistent singular control problem originating from irreversible reinsurance decisions with non-exponential discount. A novel definition of equilibrium for time-inconsistent singular control problems is introduced. For…
In this work, we study the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for monotone generalized noncooperative games with set constraints and shared affine inequality constraints. A distributed regularized penalty method is proposed. The…
In this paper we study stochastic control problems with delayed information, that is, the control at time $t$ can depend only on the information observed before time $t-H$ for some delay parameter $H$. Such delay occurs frequently in…
Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…
This paper addresses a novel \emph{cost-sensitive} distributionally robust log-optimal portfolio problem, where the investor faces \emph{ambiguous} return distributions, and a general convex transaction cost model is incorporated. The…
For a non-cooperative m-persons differential game, the value functions ofthe various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.Nashequilibrium solutions in feedback form can be obtained by studying a related system of…
We study the distributionally robust optimization (DRO) in a dynamic context where the model uncertainty is captured by penalizing potential models in function of their adapted Wasserstein distance to a given reference model. We consider…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…