Related papers: Uniformly Self-Justified Equilibria
This paper studies optimal consumption and saving decisions under uncertainty about the transition dynamics of the economic environment. We consider a general optimal savings problem in which the exogenous state governing discounting,…
This paper characterizes DSGE models as fixed-point selection devices for self-referential economic specifications. We formalize this structure as $(S, T, \Pi)$: specification, self-referential operator, and equilibrium selector. The…
In recent years we have witnessed a growing interest in various non-equilibrium systems described in terms of stochastic non-linear field theories. In some of those systems like the KPZ and related models, the interesting behavior is in the…
We introduce the Estimated Dynamic Equilibrium Model (EDEM), an agent-based framework that treats supply and demand as a coupled stochastic process driven by heterogeneous, noisy agent valuations. The model's primary technical contribution…
Real-world data streams can change unpredictably due to distribution shifts, feedback loops and adversarial actors, which challenges the validity of forecasts. We present a forecasting framework ensuring valid uncertainty estimates…
Methods for learning optimal policies in autonomous agents often assume that the way the domain is conceptualised---its possible states and actions and their causal structure---is known in advance and does not change during learning. This…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
Strategic multi-agent systems are fundamentally characterized by decentralization, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Agents operating under limited observations will often need to make decisions based on simplified internal models of the…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
We address the reachability problem for continuous-time stochastic dynamic systems. Our objective is to present a unified framework that characterizes the reachable set of a dynamic system in the presence of both stochastic disturbances and…
While the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ensures incentive compatibility for a static one-shot game, it does not appear to be feasible to construct a dominant truth-telling mechanism for agents that are stochastic dynamic systems.…
Joint Embedding Predictive Architectures (JEPA) offer a scalable paradigm for self-supervised learning by predicting latent representations rather than reconstructing high-entropy observations. However, existing formulations rely on…
Stochastic optimal control problems have a long tradition in applied probability, with the questions addressed being of high relevance in a multitude of fields. Even though theoretical solutions are well understood in many scenarios, their…
Standard macroeconomic models assume that households are rational in the sense that they are perfect utility maximizers, and explain economic dynamics in terms of shocks that drive the economy away from the stead-state. Here we build on a…
We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…
We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally and each person updates…
As a schematic model of the complexity economic agents are confronted with, we introduce the ``SK-game'', a discrete time binary choice model inspired from mean-field spin-glasses. We show that even in a completely static environment,…
Organisms and ecological groups accumulate evidence to make decisions. Classic experiments and theoretical studies have explored this process when the correct choice is fixed during each trial. However, we live in a constantly changing…