Related papers: Axiomatic characterizations of consistent approval…
Paper develops axiomatic characterization of the family of majority vote rules in the way alternative to characterization of the majority vote given in paper of Kenneth O. May in the 1952. This, similar but different, axiomatics focuses on…
In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins…
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
The goal of this paper is to propose and study properties of multiwinner voting rules which can be consider as generalisations of single-winner scoring voting rules. We consider SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, and several variants of…
Over the past few years, the (parameterized) complexity landscape of constructive control for many prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting (ABMV) rules has been explored. We expand these results in two directions. First, we study…
Approval-Based Committee (ABC) rules are an important tool for choosing a fair set of candidates when given the preferences of a collection of voters. Though finding a winning committee for many ABC rules is NP-hard, natural variations for…
We study the parameterized complexity of winner determination problems for three prevalent $k$-committee selection rules, namely the minimax approval voting (MAV), the proportional approval voting (PAV), and the Chamberlin-Courant's…
People care about decision outcomes and how decisions get made, both when making decisions and reflecting on decisions. But formalizing the full range of normative concerns that drive decisions is an open challenge. We introduce Axiomatic…
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting,…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation during preference…
Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…
Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness,…
Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for choosing one notion over another remain poorly understood.…
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous representation voting rules: the Chamberlin-Courant (in short CC)…
The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively,…
Perpetual voting was recently introduced as a framework for long-term collective decision making. In this framework, we consider a sequence of subsequent approval-based elections and try to achieve a fair overall outcome. To achieve…