Related papers: Parameterized Algorithms for Kidney Exchange
We propose a way in which Kidney exchange can be feasibly, economically and efficiently implemented in Indian medical space, named as Indian Kidney Exchange Program(IKEP) along with Indian specific influence on compatibility and final…
In barter exchanges agents enter seeking to swap their items for other items on their wishlist. We consider a centralized barter exchange with a set of agents and items where each item has a positive value. The goal is to compute a…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the…
The goal of a kidney exchange program (KEP) is to maximize number of transplants within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP can be modelled as a maximum matching problem in a graph. A KEP between…
We study the parameterized complexity of a recently introduced multi-agent variant of the Kidney Exchange problem. Given a directed graph $G$ and integers $d$ and $k$, the standard problem asks whether $G$ contains a packing of…
We introduce the Stackelberg kidney exchange problem. In this problem, an agent (e.g. a hospital or a national organization) has control over a number of incompatible patient-donor pairs whose patients are in need of a transplant. The agent…
Kidney exchange programs have been developed to find compatible kidneys for recipients who have incompatible donors. On the other hand, patients who do not have a living donor depend upon deceased donor (DD) donations to get a kidney…
Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…
We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs to be distributed amongst the participating countries in a…
Current kidney exchange pools are of moderate size and thin, as they consist of many highly sensitized patients. Creating a thicker pool can be done by waiting for many pairs to arrive. We analyze a simple class of matching algorithms that…
Kidney Exchange Programmes (KEPs) facilitate the exchange of kidneys, and larger pools of recipient-donor pairs tend to yield proportionally more transplants, leading to the proposal of international KEPs (IKEPs). However, as studied by…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired donations, combining deceased and living donor allocation mechanisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each…
Kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for end-stage renal disease, yet the scarcity of donors and inefficiencies in allocation systems create major bottlenecks, resulting in prolonged wait times and alarming mortality rates.…
We consider the Stochastic Matching problem, which is motivated by applications in kidney exchange and online dating. In this problem, we are given an undirected graph. Each edge is assigned a known, independent probability of existence and…
Incompatibility between patient and donor is a major barrier in kidney transplantation (KT). The increasing shortage of kidney donors has driven the development of desensitization techniques to overcome this immunological challenge.…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
In graph modification problems, one is given a graph G and the goal is to apply a minimum number of modification operations (such as edge deletions) to G such that the resulting graph fulfills a certain property. For example, the Cluster…