Related papers: Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…
Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…
We design and test an efficient democratic process for developing policies that reflect informed public will. The process combines AI-enabled collective dialogues that make deliberation democratically viable at scale with bridging-based…
This paper introduces Propose or Vote (PoV), a democratic procedure for collective decision-making and elections that does not rely on a central mechanism designer. In the first stage, members of a polity choose whether to become…
Autonomous AI agents capable of complex planning and action mark a shift beyond today's generative tools. As these systems enter political and economic life, who can access them, how capable they are, and how many can be deployed will shape…
We propose a formal foundation for reasoning about access control policies within a Dynamic Coalition, defining an abstraction over existing access control models and providing mechanisms for translation of those models into…
A principal contracts with an agent through an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate the interaction, she can restrict the menus of contracts the delegate may offer. We characterize the outcomes implementable…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have extended their capabilities from basic text processing to complex reasoning tasks, including legal interpretation, argumentation, and strategic interaction. However, empirical…
In representative democracies, the election of new representatives in regular election cycles is meant to prevent corruption and other misbehavior by elected officials and to keep them accountable in service of the ``will of the people."…
We investigate opinion dynamics in multi-agent networks when a bias toward one of two possible opinions exists; for example, reflecting a status quo vs a superior alternative. Starting with all agents sharing an initial opinion representing…
We consider multi-agent argumentation, where each agent's view of the arguments is encoded as an argumentation framework (AF). Then we study deliberative processes than can occur on this basis. We think of a deliberative process as taking…
Every representative democracy must specify a mechanism under which voters choose their representatives. The most common mechanism in the United States -- Winner takes all single-member districts -- both enables substantial partisan…
LLMs often underperform on complex reasoning tasks when relying on a single generation-and-selection pipeline. Inference-time ensemble methods can improve performance by sampling diverse reasoning paths or aggregating multiple candidate…
Decision-makers in high-stakes selection processes often face a fundamental choice: whether to make decisions themselves or to delegate authority to another entity whose incentives may only be partially aligned with their own. Such…
Despite impressive performance in many benchmark datasets, AI models can still make mistakes, especially among out-of-distribution examples. It remains an open question how such imperfect models can be used effectively in collaboration with…
We study how governments promote social welfare through the design of contracting environments. We model the regulation of contracting as default delegation: the government chooses a delegation set of contract terms it is willing to…
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) aim to enable participatory governance, but in practice face challenges of voter apathy, concentration of voting power, and misaligned delegation. Existing delegation mechanisms often reinforce…
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to identify outcomes that are Pareto optimal and to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process. We consider participation notions as formalized by…