Related papers: WFDefProxy: Modularly Implementing and Empirically…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited over anonymized connections by analyzing patterns in network traffic flows, such as packet sizes, directions, or interval times using a machine learning classifier. Previous…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) is an effective tool for regulating and governing the dark web. However, its performance can be significantly degraded by backdoor poisoning attacks in practical deployments. This paper aims to address the…
Tor is an anonymity network used by millions of people every day to evade censorship and protect their browsing activity from privacy threats such as mass surveillance. Unfortunately, Tor has been shown to be vulnerable to website…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks, usually conducted with the help of a machine learning-based classifier, enable a network eavesdropper to pinpoint which web page a user is accessing through the inspection of traffic patterns. These…
Tor recently integrated a circuit padding framework for creating padding machines: defenses that work by defining state machines that inject dummy traffic to protect against traffic analysis attacks like Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks.…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks, which covertly monitor user communications to identify the web pages they visit, pose a serious threat to user privacy. Existing WF defenses attempt to reduce attack accuracy by disrupting traffic…
Recent studies have shown that Tor onion (hidden) service websites are particularly vulnerable to website fingerprinting attacks due to their limited number and sensitive nature. In this work we present a multi-level feature analysis of…
Website Fingerprinting attacks enable a passive eavesdropper to recover the user's otherwise anonymized web browsing activity by matching the observed traffic with prerecorded web traffic templates. The defenses that have been proposed to…
Several studies have shown that the network traffic that is generated by a visit to a website over Tor reveals information specific to the website through the timing and sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between users…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks can effectively identify the websites visited by Tor clients via analyzing encrypted traffic patterns. Existing attacks focus on identifying different websites, but their accuracy dramatically decreases…
A passive local eavesdropper can leverage Website Fingerprinting (WF) to deanonymize the web browsing activity of Tor users. The value of timing information to WF has often been discounted in recent works due to the volatility of low-level…
Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware path-selection algorithms that propose to solve this problem are…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited by users by performing traffic analysis, compromising user privacy. Particularly, DL-based WF attacks demonstrate impressive attack performance. However, the effectiveness of…
Website fingerprinting enables an eavesdropper to determine which websites a user is visiting over an encrypted connection. State-of-the-art website fingerprinting (WF) attacks have demonstrated effectiveness even against Tor-protected…
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a technique that allows an eavesdropper to determine the website a target user is accessing by inspecting the metadata associated with the packets she exchanges via some encrypted tunnel, e.g., Tor. Recent WF…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks aim to infer which websites a user is visiting by analyzing traffic patterns, thereby compromising user anonymity. Although this technique has been demonstrated to be effective in controlled experimental…
The Tor anonymity network has been shown vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by autonomous systems and Internet exchanges, which can observe different overlay hops belonging to the same circuit. We aim to determine whether network path…
Website fingerprinting attack (WFA) aims to deanonymize the website a user is visiting through anonymous networks channels (e.g., Tor). Despite of remarkable progress in the past years, most existing methods make implicitly a couple of…
Website fingerprinting enables an attacker to infer which web page a client is browsing through encrypted or anonymized network connections. We present a new website fingerprinting technique based on random decision forests and evaluate…
Obtaining and maintaining anonymity on the Internet is challenging. The state of the art in deployed tools, such as Tor, uses onion routing (OR) to relay encrypted connections on a detour passing through randomly chosen relays scattered…