Related papers: Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
Peer-prediction is a (meta-)mechanism which, given any proper scoring rule, produces a mechanism to elicit privately-held, non-verifiable information from self-interested agents. Formally, truth-telling is a strict Nash equilibrium of the…
The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by…
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of participants is a more effective approach to increase revenue…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…
Consider a mechanism that cannot observe how many players there are directly, but instead must rely on their self-reports to know how many are participating. Suppose the players can create new identities to report to the auctioneer at some…
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines…
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
This paper studies mechanism design for revenue maximization in a distribution-reporting setting, where the auctioneer does not know the buyers' true value distributions. Instead, each buyer reports and commits to a bid distribution in the…
Auctions are key for maximizing sellers' revenue and ensuring truthful bidding among buyers. Recently, an approach known as differentiable economics based on machine learning (ML) has shown promise in learning powerful auction mechanisms…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pricing structure induces users to reveal the true likelihoods that they will purchase a given resource.…
We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy…
If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if…
We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…