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We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a…
Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that…
We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…
We introduce a coevolutionary framework in which punishment intensity dynamically adapts to the fraction of cooperators in the population. Unlike static models, adaptive punishment reshapes the effective payoff landscape, driving…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
Evolutionary game theory combines game theory and dynamical systems and is customarily adopted to describe evolutionary dynamics in multi-agent systems. In particular, it has been proven to be a successful tool to describe multi-agent…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model with death/birth dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs in a prisoners dilemma game played between network neighbours. The mean field…
In this paper, we consider the replicator-mutator dynamics for pairwise social dilemmas where the payoff entries are random variables. The randomness is incorporated to take into account the uncertainty, which is inevitable in practical…