Related papers: Preference Communication in Multi-Objective Normal…
We study the emergence of communication in multiagent adversarial settings inspired by the classic Imitation game. A class of three player games is used to explore how agents based on sequence to sequence (Seq2Seq) models can learn to…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
Recommender system has been deployed in a large amount of real-world applications, profoundly influencing people's daily life and production.Traditional recommender models mostly collect as comprehensive as possible user behaviors for…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
Recent work on decision making and planning for autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem are…
We consider a Stackelberg game in which a principal (she) establishes a two-stage contract with a non-myopic agent (he) whose type is unknown. The contract takes the form of an incentive function mapping the agent's first-stage action to…
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or…
Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to…
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the…
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relevant state. An information designer determines the fidelity…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between…
The literature in modern machine learning has only negative results for learning to communicate between competitive agents using standard RL. We introduce a modified sender-receiver game to study the spectrum of partially-competitive…
This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing…
We present a quantization scheme for a three-player Prisoner's Dilemma game. It is shown that entanglement plays a dominant role in the three-player quantum game. Four different types of payoffs are identified on the basis of different…
A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players uses a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
We consider repeated games where the players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that, when the players have calibrated strategies and behave according to CPT, the natural analog of the notion of correlated…