Related papers: Information Spillover in Multiple Zero-sum Games

We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be…

This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…

Information design in an incomplete information game includes a designer with the goal of influencing players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution so that its objective function is optimized. We…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (1996a, 1996b), De Meyer and Marino (2005) provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with incomplete information on two sides, in the independent case. In…

We outline the general construction of three-players games with incomplete information which fulfil the following conditions: (i) symmetry with respect to the exchange of the players; (ii) the existence of the upper bound for total payoff…

This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by…

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid development of quantum information processing, a new paradigm which studies the power and limit of "quantum advantages" in various information processing tasks. Problems such as when quantum…

Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may interpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst's "confidence" in a strategic…

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…

One of the reasons why stochastic dynamic games with an underlying dynamic system are challenging is since strategic players have access to enormous amount of information which leads to the use of extremely complex strategies at…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

Poker is in the family of imperfect information games unlike other games such as chess, connect four, etc which are perfect information game instead. While many perfect information games have been solved, no non-trivial imperfect…

In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…