Related papers: Moral Hazard, Dynamic Incentives, and Ambiguous Pe…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
We introduce a model-free preference under ambiguity, as a primitive trait of behavior, which we apply once as well as repeatedly. Its single and double application yield simple, easily interpretable definitions of ambiguity aversion and…
This paper studies dynamic asset allocation with interest rate risk and several sources of ambiguity. The market consists of a risk-free asset, a zero-coupon bond (both determined by a Vasicek model), and a stock. There is ambiguity about…
Data in the real world often has an evolving distribution. Thus, machine learning models trained on such data get outdated over time. This phenomenon is called model drift. Knowledge of this drift serves two purposes: (i) Retain an accurate…
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring…
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…
Dynamic game theory is an increasingly popular tool for modeling multi-agent, e.g. human-robot, interactions. Game-theoretic models presume that each agent wishes to minimize a private cost function that depends on others' actions. These…
We combine forward investment performance processes and ambiguity averse portfolio selection. We introduce the notion of robust forward criteria which addresses the issues of ambiguity in model specification and in preferences and…
In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced in [17], with optimal contracting between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian…
We introduce contracts for linear dynamical systems with inputs and outputs. Contracts are used to express formal specifications on the dynamic behaviour of such systems through two aspects: assumptions and guarantees. The assumptions are a…
Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
In this paper we consider a principal agent problem where the agent is allowed to quit, by incurring a cost. When the current agent quits the job, the principal will hire a new one, possibly with a different type. We characterize the…
Recent research in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has shown success in learning social behavior and cooperation. Social dilemmas between agents in mixed-sum settings have been studied extensively, but there is little research…
Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification.…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) enable novel use cases in domains where responsible action is increasingly important. Yet the inherent unpredictability of LLMs raises safety concerns about agent reliability. In…
We present a first approximation of agent behaviour in a generalized model in contract theory. This model relaxes some of the the assumptions of one of the classical models allowing to include a broader range of agents. We introduce the…
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts -- known in economics…
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent…