Related papers: Moral Hazard, Dynamic Incentives, and Ambiguous Pe…

We propose a new principal-agent framework where a principal communicates a roadmap -- a set of plausible outcome models and a prior belief over them -- to guide an agent who is learning the value of innovation. The agent trusts the prior…

We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revise contract terms upon knowing an agent's type. Alterations…

This paper proposes a method to design an optimal dynamic contract between a principal and an agent, who has the authority to control both the principal's revenue and an engineered system. The key characteristic of our problem setting is…

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris (1999)), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about…

Motivated by the growing requirements on the operation of complex engineering systems, we present contracts as specifications for continuous-time linear dynamical systems with inputs and outputs. A contract is defined as a pair of…

We consider the robust contract design problem when the principal only has limited information about the actions the agent can take. The principal evaluates a contract according to its worst-case performance caused by the uncertain action…

This paper investigates the moral hazard problem in finite horizon with both continuous and lump-sum payments, involving a time-inconsistent sophisticated agent and a standard utility maximiser principal. Building upon the so-called dynamic…

I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract specifies a menu of insurance policies, contingent on…

I introduce dynamic correlation as an incentive instrument to address moral hazard. A firm mediates interactions between a long-lived worker and short-lived clients. I show that optimal mediation induces a nonstationary correlated…

Data drift is the change in model input data that is one of the key factors leading to machine learning models performance degradation over time. Monitoring drift helps detecting these issues and preventing their harmful consequences.…

I study a moral hazard problem between a principal and multiple agents who experience positive peer effects represented by a (weighted) network. Under the optimal linear contract, the principal provides high-powered incentives to central…

The accelerating adoption of language models (LMs) as agents for deployment in long-context tasks motivates a thorough understanding of goal drift: agents' tendency to deviate from an original objective. While prior-generation language…

This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…

This article studies the problem of evaluating the information that a Principal lacks when establishing an incentive contract with an Agent whose effort is not observable. The Principal ("she") pays a continuous rent to the Agent ("he"),…

What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…

Machine learning has become increasingly popular in informing data-driven policy-making. Policies influence behavior in individuals or populations, and ideally, through observational signals, policy-makers learn which policies are…

Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…

Many real-world situations of ethical relevance, in particular those of large-scale social choice such as mitigating climate change, involve not only many agents whose decisions interact in complicated ways, but also various forms of…

We study a dynamic asset pricing problem in which a representative agent is ambiguous about the aggregate endowment growth rate and trades a risky stock, human capital, and a risk-free asset to maximize her preference value of consumption…