Related papers: Free Riding in Networks
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
This paper examines public goods and evaluates the mechanism through the game theory. Public goods are characterized by nonexclusivity and nonrivalry and this creates fundamental challenges for allocation. We analyze why competitive markets…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We explore the impact of mutual altruism among the players belonging to the same set -- their tribe -- in a partition of all players in arbitrary strategic games upon the quality of equilibria attained. To this end, we introduce the notion…
Autonomous vehicles will be an integral part of ride-sharing services in the future. This setting differs from traditional ride-sharing marketplaces because of the absence of the supply side (drivers). However, it has far-reaching…
The problem of free-riding arises when individuals benefit from a shared resource, service, or public good without contributing proportionately to its provision. This conduct often leads to a collective action problem, as individuals pursue…
How to form groups in a mobility system that offers shared rides, and how to split the costs within the travellers of a group, are non-trivial tasks, as two objectives conflict: 1) minimising the total costs of the system, and 2) making…
The rate at which nodes in a network increase their connectivity depends on their fitness to compete for links. For example, in social networks some individuals acquire more social links than others, or on the www some webpages attract…
Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means…
A model of providing service in a P2P network is analyzed. It is shown that by adding a scrip system, a mechanism that admits a reasonable Nash equilibrium that reduces free riding can be obtained. The effect of varying the total amount of…
It is known that individuals in social networks tend to exhibit homophily (a.k.a. assortative mixing) in their social ties, which implies that they prefer bonding with others of their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon?…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
In the digital age, resources such as open-source software and publicly accessible databases form a crucial category of digital public goods, providing extensive benefits for Internet. This paper investigates networked public goods games…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph,…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…