Related papers: Persuasion by Dimension Reduction
Agents that learn to select optimal actions represent a prominent focus of the sequential decision-making literature. In the face of a complex environment or constraints on time and resources, however, aiming to synthesize such an optimal…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
We investigate the geometry of optimal memoryless time independent decision making in relation to the amount of information that the acting agent has about the state of the system. We show that the expected long term reward, discounted or…
We model the interaction between a user and an AI driven recommendation system. The user initiates the process by conveying preference information through a costly and noisy message. The AI assistant, acting as a Bayesian agent, interprets…
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers…
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if…
Large scale dynamical systems (e.g. many nonlinear coupled differential equations) can often be summarized in terms of only a few state variables (a few equations), a trait that reduces complexity and facilitates exploration of behavioral…
A key limitation in using various modern methods of machine learning in developing feedback control policies is the lack of appropriate methodologies to analyze their long-term dynamics, in terms of making any sort of guarantees (even…
We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be…
A common way of characterizing minimax estimators in point estimation is by moving the problem into the Bayesian estimation domain and finding a least favorable prior distribution. The Bayesian estimator induced by a least favorable prior,…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
Persuasion is the process of changing an agent's belief distribution from a given (or estimated) prior to a desired posterior. A common assumption in the acceptance of information or misinformation as fact is that the (mis)information must…
This paper examines the optimal design of information sharing in organizations. Organizational performance depends on agents adapting to uncertain external environments while coordinating their actions, where coordination incentives and…
It is challenging to quantify numerical preferences for different objectives in a multi-objective decision-making problem. However, the demonstrations of a user are often accessible. We propose an algorithm to infer linear preference…
Dimension reduction lies at the heart of many statistical methods. In regression, dimension reduction has been linked to the notion of sufficiency whereby the relation of the response to a set of predictors is explained by a lower…
This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of…
A principal wishes to transact business with a multidimensional distribution of agents whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. Assuming a twist (= generalized Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing) hypothesis and that agents can choose…
When people choose what messages to send to others, they often consider how others will interpret the messages. A sender may expect a receiver to engage in motivated reasoning, leading the receiver to trust good news more than bad news,…
Text documents are complex high dimensional objects. To effectively visualize such data it is important to reduce its dimensionality and visualize the low dimensional embedding as a 2-D or 3-D scatter plot. In this paper we explore…