Related papers: Moral Hazard with Heterogeneous Beliefs
Different voters behave differently, different governments make different decisions, or different organizations are ruled differently. Many research questions important to political scientists concern choice behavior, which involves dealing…
When a population is engaged in successive prisoner's dilemmas, indirect reciprocity through reputation fosters cooperation through the emergence of moral and action rules. A simplified model has recently been proposed where individuals…
We propose a new principal-agent framework where a principal communicates a roadmap -- a set of plausible outcome models and a prior belief over them -- to guide an agent who is learning the value of innovation. The agent trusts the prior…
We study the problem of an agent continuously faced with the decision of placing or not placing trust in an institution. The agent makes use of Bayesian learning in order to estimate the institution's true trustworthiness and makes the…
This paper examines the impact of introducing a Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) agent into a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) pure-exchange economy with no aggregate uncertainty. In the absence of the RDU agent, the classical theory predicts that…
Understanding the emergence of inequality in complex systems requires attention to both structural dynamics and intrinsic heterogeneity. In the context of opinion dynamics, traditional models relied on static snapshots or assumed…
Recent research in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has shown success in learning social behavior and cooperation. Social dilemmas between agents in mixed-sum settings have been studied extensively, but there is little research…
We suggest that one individual holds multiple degrees of belief about an outcome, given the evidence. We then investigate the implications of such noisy probabilities for a buyer and a seller of binary options and find the odds agreed upon…
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up in a high trust or low trust state. We model this by a discrete time, random matching stochastic coordination game. Agents…
In the Ultimatum Game (UG) one player, named "proposer", has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between herself and a "responder". If the offer is greater than or equal to the responder's minimum acceptable offer (MAO),…
Using theory and experiments, this paper shows that the difficulty of making tradeoffs offers a parsimonious explanation for a wide range of behavioral phenomena. We develop a model of imprecise comparisons applicable to multiattribute,…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…
A broad set of empirical phenomenon in the study of social, economic and machine behaviour can be modelled as complex systems with averaging dynamics. However many of these models naturally result in consensus or consensus-like outcomes. In…
Heterogeneity has been studied as one of the most common explanations of the puzzle of cooperation in social dilemmas. A large number of papers have been published discussing the effects of increasing heterogeneity in structured populations…
Humans display significant uncertainty when confronted with moral dilemmas, yet the extent of such uncertainty in machines and AI agents remains underexplored. Recent studies have confirmed the overly confident tendencies of…
The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…
A new agent-based, bounded-confidence model for discrete one-dimensional opinion dynamics is presented. The agents interact if their opinions do not differ more than a tolerance parameter. In pairwise interactions, one of the pair, randomly…
I introduce heterogeneity into the analysis of peer effects that arise from conformity, allowing the strength of the taste for conformity to vary across agents' actions. Using a structural model based on a simultaneous network game with…
Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people's preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct…
We propose a belief-formation model where agents attempt to discriminate between two theories, and where the asymmetry in strength between confirming and disconfirming evidence tilts beliefs in favor of theories that generate strong (and…