Related papers: Detecting Timing Attack on PMU Data utilizing Unwr…
The Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) is an important metering device for smart grid. Like any other Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), PMUs are prone to various types of cyberattacks. However, one form of attack is unique to the PMU, the…
State estimation is a data processing algorithm for converting redundant meter measurements and other information into an estimate of the state of a power system. Relying heavily on meter measurements, state estimation has proven to be…
With the deeper penetration of inverter-based resources in power systems, false data injection attacks (FDIA) are a growing cyber-security concern. They have the potential to disrupt the system's stability like frequency stability, thereby…
This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement…
Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle…
This paper presents a new framework of identifying a series of cyber data attacks on power system synchrophasor measurements. We focus on detecting "unobservable" cyber data attacks that cannot be detected by any existing method that purely…
Real time operation of the power grid and synchronism of its different elements require accurate estimation of its state variables. Errors in state estimation will lead to sub-optimal Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solutions and subsequent…
Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be…
Power systems become more prone to cyber-attacks due to the high integration of information technologies. In this paper, we demonstrate that the outages of some lines can be masked by injecting false data into a set of measurements. The…
A novel false data injection attack (FDIA) model against DC state estimation is proposed, which requires no network parameters and exploits only limited phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. The proposed FDIA model can target specific states…
The GPS is vulnerable to GPS spoofing attack (GSA), which leads to disorder in time and position results of the GPS receiver. In power grids, phasor measurement units (PMUs) use GPS to build time-tagged measurements, so they are susceptible…
False data injection attacks (FDIA) are a main category of cyber-attacks threatening the security of power systems. Contrary to the detection of these attacks, less attention has been paid to identifying the attacked units of the grid. To…
This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible…
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex…
Fast and accurate detection of cyberattacks is a key element for a cyber-resilient power system. Recently, data-driven detectors and physics-based Moving Target Defences (MTD) have been proposed to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks…
Consider the problem of mitigating the impact on data integrity of phasor measurement units (PMUs) given a GPS spoofing attack. We present a sparse error correction framework to treat PMU measurements that are potentially corrupted due to a…
Robust control and maintenance of the grid relies on accurate data. Both PMUs and state estimators are prone to false data injection attacks. Thus, it is crucial to have a mechanism for fast and accurate detection of an agent maliciously…
Most traditional false data injection attack (FDIA) detection approaches rely on a key assumption, i.e., the power system can be accurately modeled. However, the transmission line parameters are dynamic and cannot be accurately known during…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) represent a major class of attacks that aim to break the integrity of measurements by injecting false data into the smart metering devices in power grids. To the best of authors' knowledge, no study has…
Data analysis and monitoring on smart grids are jeopardized by attacks on cyber-physical systems. False data injection attack (FDIA) is one of the classes of those attacks that target the smart measurement devices by injecting malicious…