Related papers: Joint Information and Mechanism Design for Queues …
We develop an integrated framework for information design and mechanism design in screening environments with quasilinear utility. Using the tools of majorization theory and quantile functions, we show that both information design and…
We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
Search and recommendation are the two most common approaches used by people to obtain information. They share the same goal -- satisfying the user's information need at the right time. There are already a lot of Internet platforms and Apps…
Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…
The quality of software is enhanced by using the design patterns. The design patterns are the reusable component used in the development of the software, which delivers improved quality software to the end users. The researchers have…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
We study an information design problem for a non-atomic service scheduling game. The service starts at a random time and there is a continuum of agent population who have a prior belief about the service start time but do not observe the…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Data-driven predictions are often perceived as inaccurate in hindsight due to behavioral responses. In this study, we explore the role of interface design choices in shaping individuals' decision-making processes in response to predictions…
Delay or queue length information has the potential to influence the decision of a customer to use a service system. Thus, it is imperative for service system managers to understand how the information that they provide will affect the…
Crowdfunding has emerged as a prominent way for entrepreneurs to secure funding without sophisticated intermediation. In crowdfunding, an entrepreneur often has to decide how to disclose the campaign status in order to collect as many…
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the…
We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and discloses information to the users with the goal of…
An information broker incentivizes consumers to share their information, while designing an information structure to shape the market segmentation. The information broker is a metaphor for an Internet platform that matches consumers with…
Giving customers queue length information about a service system has the potential to influence the decision of a customer to join a queue. Thus, it is imperative for managers of queueing systems to understand how the information that they…
We develop a versatile methodology for multidimensional mechanism design that incorporates side information about agents to generate high welfare and high revenue simultaneously. Side information sources include advice from domain experts,…
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver faces a sequential decision making (SDM) problem. At each…
This paper studies information asymmetry in an unobservable single-server queueing system. While system managers have knowledge of the true arrival rate, customers may lack this information and instead form arbitrary beliefs. We propose a…