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The paper is a second in a series of two papers evaluating the power of a new scheme that generates search heuristics mechanically. The heuristics are extracted from an approximation scheme called mini-bucket elimination that was recently…
One of the most important quantum algorithms ever discovered is Grover's algorithm for searching an unordered set. We give a new lower bound in the query model which proves that Grover's algorithm is exactly optimal. Similar to existing…
We present the first formal verification of approximation algorithms for NP-complete optimization problems: vertex cover, independent set, set cover, center selection, load balancing, and bin packing. We uncover incompletenesses in existing…
In this paper, we consider the social optimal problem of discrete time finite state space mean field games (referred to as finite mean field games [1]). Unlike the individual optimization of their own cost function in competitive models, in…
We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…
In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these…
Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…
Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…
Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…
We refine existing general network optimization techniques, give new characterizations for the class of problems to which they can be applied, and show that they can also be used to solve various two-player games in almost linear time.…
Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…
We explore the question of how to learn an optimal search strategy within the example of a parking problem where parking opportunities arrive according to an unknown inhomogeneous Poisson process. The optimal policy is a threshold-type…
This thesis investigates the extent to which the optimal value of a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) can be approximated by some sentence of fixed point logic with counting (FPC). It is known that, assuming $\mathsf{P} \neq…
We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable…
In a reachability-time game, players Min and Max choose moves so that the time to reach a final state in a timed automaton is minimised or maximised, respectively. Asarin and Maler showed decidability of reachability-time games on strongly…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…
Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…