Related papers: Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Informat…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Problem definition: Traditionally, New York City's top 8 public schools have selected candidates solely based on their scores in the Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT). These scores are known to be impacted by socioeconomic…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
We extend the seminal model of Pathak and S\"onmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two districts. In our setting, in addition to each student…
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call the…
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted $\mathcal{R}_1$ and $\mathcal{R}_2$. In round $\mathcal{R}_1$, the capacity of each…
This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken…
We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
A growing number of authorities use mechanisms to allocate students to schools in a way that reflects student preferences and school priorities. However, most real-world mechanisms incentivize students to strategically misreport their…
We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…