Related papers: On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Lo…

Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…

We study the mechanism design problem of facility location on a metric space in the learning-augmented framework, where mechanisms have access to imperfect predictions of the optimal facility locations. Our objective is to design…

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private…

We consider a discrete facility location problem with a new form of equity criterion. The model discussed in the paper analyzes the case where demand points only have strict preference order on the sites where the plants can be located. The…

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…

We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each…

We consider the strategyproof facility location problem on a circle. We focus on the case of 5 agents, and find a tight bound for the PCD strategyproof mechanism, which selects the reported location of an agent in proportion to the length…

We study the problem of a planner who resolves risk-return trade-offs - like financial investment decisions - on behalf of a collective of agents with heterogeneous risk preferences. The planner's objective is a two-stage utility functional…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and…

In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…

We consider a two-stage robust facility location problem on a metric under an uncertain demand. The decision-maker needs to decide on the (integral) units of supply for each facility in the first stage to satisfy an uncertain second-stage…

We study the problem of online facility location with delay. In this problem, a sequence of $n$ clients appear in the metric space, and they need to be eventually connected to some open facility. The clients do not have to be connected…

We study a version of the metric facility location problem (or, equivalently, variants of the committee selection problem) in which we must choose $k$ facilities in an arbitrary metric space to serve some set of clients $C$. We consider…

In this paper, we provide a rigorous theoretical investigation of an online learning version of the Facility Location problem which is motivated by emerging problems in real-world applications. In our formulation, we are given a set of…

This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost…

We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…

We study the facility location mechanism design problem where $n$ agents report their locations in Euclidean space, and the output is a single facility location. The cost function of each agent is the distance from the returned facility,…

We consider a social choice setting with agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups, and have metric preferences over a set of alternatives. Our goal is to choose a single alternative aiming to optimize various objectives that are…

We consider facility location problems with a new form of equity criterion. Demand points have preference order on the sites where the plants can be located. The goal is to find the location of the facilities minimizing the envy felt by the…