Related papers: Implementing Security Protocol Monitors
We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…
We propose a performance evaluation method for security protocols. Based on the informal specification, we construct a canonical model which includes, alongside protocol messages, cryptographic operations performed by participants in the…
Incorrect implementations of network protocol message specifications affect the stability, security, and cost of network system development. Most implementation defects fall into one of three categories of well defined message constraints.…
The AI Control research agenda aims to develop control protocols: safety techniques that prevent untrusted AI systems from taking harmful actions during deployment. Because human oversight is expensive, one approach is trusted monitoring,…
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) show that, when…
Accountability is a recent paradigm in security protocol design which aims to eliminate traditional trust assumptions on parties and hold them accountable for their misbehavior. It is meant to establish trust in the first place and to…
Conventional approaches for ensuring the security of application software at run-time, through monitoring, either produce (high rates of) false alarms (e.g. intrusion detection systems) or limit application performance (e.g. run-time…
In this paper, we present a new formal method to analyze cryptographic protocols statically for the property of secrecy. It consists in inspecting the level of security of every component in the protocol and making sure that it does not…
Security protocols enable secure communication over insecure channels. Privacy protocols enable private interactions over secure channels. Security protocols set up secure channels using cryptographic primitives. Privacy protocols set up…
The Echo protocol tries to do secure location verification using physical limits imposed by the speeds of light and sound. While the protocol is able to guarantee that a certain object is within a certain region, it cannot ensure the…
We propose a comparative performance evaluation of security protocols. The novelty of our approach lies in the use of a polynomial mathematical model that captures the performance of classes of cryptographic algorithms instead of capturing…
The verification of security protocols is essential, in order to ensure the absence of potential attacks. However, verification results are only valid with respect to the assumptions under which the verification was performed. These…
The present paper introduces a practical protocol for provably secure, outsourced computation. Our protocol minimizes overhead for verification by requiring solutions to withstand an interactive game between a prover and challenger. For…
This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…
A model-theoretic approach can establish security theorems for cryptographic protocols. Formulas expressing authentication and non-disclosure properties of protocols have a special form. They are quantified implications for all xs . (phi…
Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and…
Ensuring the correctness of distributed system implementations remains a challenging and largely unaddressed problem. In this paper we present a protocol that can be used to certify the safety of consensus implementations. Our proposed…
Numerous exploits of client-server protocols and applications involve modifying clients to behave in ways that untampered clients would not, such as crafting malicious packets. In this paper, we demonstrate practical verification of a…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…