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In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
In the well-studied metric distortion problem in social choice, we have voters and candidates located in a shared metric space, and the objective is to design a voting rule that selects a candidate with minimal total distance to the voters.…
In this paper, we study the distortion bounds for voting mechanisms in multi-winner elections in general metric spaces. Our study pertains to the case in which each voter only reports her favorite candidate amongst $m$ possible choices.…
Distortion-based analysis has established itself as a fruitful framework for comparing voting mechanisms. m voters and n candidates are jointly embedded in an (unknown) metric space, and the voters submit rankings of candidates by…
In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, one assumes that all voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a common metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
One way of evaluating social choice (voting) rules is through a utilitarian distortion framework. In this model, we assume that agents submit full rankings over the alternatives, and these rankings are generated from underlying, but…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least $3$, and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than $3$, often at the cost…
We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with $n$ voters and $m$ candidates located in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a…
Social choice theory offers a wealth of approaches for selecting a candidate on behalf of voters based on their reported preference rankings over options. When voters have underlying utilities for these options, however, using preference…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…
In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candidate from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying metric space. A voter…
We consider models for social choice where voters rank a set of choices (or alternatives) by deliberating in small groups of size at most $k$, and these outcomes are aggregated by a social choice rule to find the winning alternative. We…
We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of $n$ voters, $m$ candidates, and $\ell$ positions are all located in a metric space. The goal is to choose a set of candidates and…
We extend the recently introduced framework of metric distortion to multiwinner voting. In this framework, $n$ agents and $m$ alternatives are located in an underlying metric space. The exact distances between agents and alternatives are…
We study the following metric distortion problem: there are two finite sets of points, $V$ and $C$, that lie in the same metric space, and our goal is to choose a point in $C$ whose total distance from the points in $V$ is as small as…
In this note, we uncover three connections between the metric distortion problem and voting methods and axioms from the social choice literature.