Related papers: Fuzzy Conventions
In this paper, we introduce an abstract fuzzy economy (generalized fuzzy game) model with a countable space of actions and we study the existence of the fuzzy equilibrium. As applications, two types of results are obtained. The first ones…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents are assumed to be irrational in their perception of the…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
A standard approach to building a fuzzy controller based on stochastic logic uses binary random signals with an average (expected value of a random variable) in the range [0, 1]. A different approach is presented, founded on a…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…
Bigraphs and their algebra is a model of concurrency. Fuzzy bigraphs are a generalization of birgraphs intended to be a model of concurrency that incorporates vagueness. More specifically, this model assumes that agents are similar,…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination…
This paper focuses on a new model to reach the existence of equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with fuzzy preferences (PXE-FP). The proposed model integrates exchange, consumption and the agent's fuzzy preference in the consumption set.…
We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…
A description of static equilibria in the noisy binary choice (Ising) game on complete and random graphs resulting from maximisation of the likelihood of system configurations is presented. An equivalence of such likelihood equilibria to…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…
This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about their opponents behaviour are capacities (fuzzy measures, non-additive probabilities). The concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty was introduced by J.Dow and S.Werlang…
In statistical physics any given system can be either at an equilibrium or away from it. Networks are not an exception. Most network models can be classified as either equilibrium or growing. Here we show that under certain conditions there…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…