Related papers: Unidirectional substitutes and complements
Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts can be represented by a network. Vertices correspond to agents while arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral contract. Given prices for each arc, agents choose the incident arcs…
In this paper we study a problem of looking for an optimal solution of a system of the differential equations with a control and an optimized function. The system of differential equations is changed for two systems with the upper and lower…
Two special situations where the standard uncertainty product inequality appears to be useless are modified. One such case is noted to also trivialize the recently-introduced alternatives [Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 260401 (2014); Sci. Rep. 6,…
The problem of demand inversion - a crucial step in the estimation of random utility discrete-choice models - is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes in two-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility…
In this paper, we consider a bidirectional relay network with half-duplex nodes and block fading where the nodes transmit with a fixed transmission rate. Thereby, user 1 and user 2 exchange information only via a relay node, i.e., a direct…
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…
This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism --which is…
We consider the bipartite matching model of customers and servers introduced by Caldentey, Kaplan, and Weiss (Adv. Appl. Probab., 2009). Customers and servers play symmetrical roles. There is a finite set C resp. S, of customer, resp.…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
The problem of approximating the discrete spectra of families of self-adjoint operators that are merely strongly continuous is addressed. It is well-known that the spectrum need not vary continuously (as a set) under strong perturbations.…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
We prove that steady state bifurcations in finite-dimensional dynamical systems that are symmetric with respect to a monoid representation generically occur along an absolutely indecomposable subrepresentation. This is stated as a…
We give properties of strict pseudocontractions and demicontractions defined on a Hilbert space, which constitute wide classes of operators that arise in iterative methods for solving fixed point problems. In particular, we give necessary…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
We propose new results for the existence and uniqueness of a general nonparametric and nonseparable competitive equilibrium with substitutes. These results ensure the invertibility of a general competitive system. The existing literature…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…
In this paper, we study the discrete-time consensus problem over networks with antagonistic and cooperative interactions. Following the work by Altafini [IEEE Trans. Automatic Control, 58 (2013), pp. 935--946], by an antagonistic…
In matching markets such as kidney exchanges and freight exchanges, delayed matching has been shown to improve overall market efficiency. The benefits of delay are highly sensitive to participants' sojourn times and departure behavior, and…
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…