Related papers: Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…
Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness,…
Linguistic norms emerge in human communities because people imitate each other. A shared linguistic system provides people with the benefits of shared knowledge and coordinated planning. Once norms are in place, why would they ever change?…
Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has focused on producing responses that meet human expectations and align with shared values - a process coined alignment. However, aligning LLMs remains challenging due to the inherent…
In practice, most spoken language understanding systems process user input in a pipelined manner; first domain is predicted, then intent and semantic slots are inferred according to the semantic frames of the predicted domain. The pipeline…
While language identification is a fundamental speech and language processing task, for many languages and language families it remains a challenging task. For many low-resource and endangered languages this is in part due to resource…
Human users increasingly communicate with large language models (LLMs), but LLMs suffer from frequent overconfidence in their output, even when its accuracy is questionable, which undermines their trustworthiness and perceived legitimacy.…
In its simplest form the well known consensus problem for a networked family of autonomous agents is to devise a set of protocols or update rules, one for each agent, which can enable all of the agents to adjust or tune their "agreement…
This paper considers the distributed consensus problem of linear multi-agent systems subject to different matching uncertainties for both the cases without and with a leader of bounded unknown control input. Due to the existence of…
The wisdom of crowds has been shown to operate not only for factual judgments but also in matters of taste, where accuracy is defined relative to an individual's preferences. However, it remains unclear how different types of social signals…
Frontier AI systems require governance mechanisms that can verify internal alignment, not just behavioral compliance. Private governance mechanisms audits, certification, insurance, and procurement are emerging to complement public…
Spoken language understanding has been addressed as a supervised learning problem, where a set of training data is available for each domain. However, annotating data for each domain is both financially costly and non-scalable so we should…
Preference tuning aligns pretrained language models to human judgments of quality, helpfulness, or safety by optimizing over explicit preference signals rather than likelihood alone. Prior work has shown that preference-tuning degrades…
Optimizing the design of complex systems requires navigating interdependent decisions, heterogeneous components, and multiple objectives. Our monotone theory of co-design offers a compositional framework for addressing this challenge,…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
In this paper, we address complexity issues for timeline-based planning over dense temporal domains. The planning problem is modeled by means of a set of independent, but interacting, components, each one represented by a number of state…
A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
Explainability is highly-desired in Machine Learning (ML) systems supporting high-stakes policy decisions in areas such as health, criminal justice, education, and employment. While the field of explainable ML has expanded in recent years,…
In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for the problem of incentivizing filtering among a finite number of strategic social media platforms. We consider the presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how…