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Data mining and knowledge discovery are two important growing research fields in the last two decades due to the abundance of data collected from various sources. The exponentially growing volumes of generated data urge the development of…
The self-organization in cooperative regimes in a simple mean-field version of a model based on "selfish" agents which play the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is studied. The agents have no memory and use strategies not based on direct…
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the…
According to evolutionary game theory, cooperation in public goods games is eliminated by free-riders, yet in nature, cooperation is ubiquitous. Artificial models resolve this contradiction via the mechanism of network reciprocity. However,…
In the context of competitive multiplayer games, collusion happens when two or more teams decide to collaborate towards a common goal, with the intention of gaining an unfair advantage from this cooperation. The task of identifying…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…
Spatial public goods games model collective dilemmas where individual payoffs depend on population-level strategy configurations. Most existing studies rely on evolutionary update rules or value-based reinforcement learning methods. These…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means…
Trust and reciprocation of it form the foundation of economic, social and other interactions. While the Trust Game is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e.,…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games, where a player would keep cooperation to avoid being retaliated by a co-player in the future. So-called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies…
This paper discusses our investigation into the evolution of cooperative players in an online business environment. We explain our design of an incentive based system with its foundation over binary reputation system whose proportion of…
Cooperation is fundamental in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), often requiring agents to balance individual gains with collective rewards. In this regard, this paper aims to investigate strategies to…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) and snowdrift game (SG), within which a fraction $\alpha$ of the payoffs of each player gained from direct game interactions is shared equally…
To understand the emergence and sustainment of cooperative behavior in interacting collectives, we perform global convergence analysis for replicator dynamics of a large, well-mixed population of individuals playing a repeated snowdrift…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
Oscillatory behaviors are ubiquitous in nature and the human society. However, most previous works fail to reproduce them in the two-strategy game-theoretical models. Here we show that oscillatory behaviors naturally emerge if incomplete…