Related papers: On Limited Non-Prioritised Belief Revision Operato…
This paper extends the applications of belief-networks to include the revision of belief commitments, i.e., the categorical acceptance of a subset of hypotheses which, together, constitute the most satisfactory explanation of the evidence…
A formal framework is given for the characterizability of a class of belief revision operators, defined using minimization over a class of partial preorders, by postulates. It is shown that for partial orders characterizability implies a…
Recent methods have adapted the well-established AGM and belief base frameworks for belief change to cover belief revision in logic programs. In this study here, we present two new sets of belief change operators for logic programs. They…
We propose a new approach to belief revision that provides a way to change knowledge bases with a minimum of effort. We call this way of revising belief states optimal belief revision. Our revision method gives special attention to the fact…
Understanding how humans revise their beliefs in light of new information is crucial for developing AI systems which can effectively model, and thus align with, human reasoning. While theoretical belief revision frameworks rely on a set of…
The Koopman operator allows for handling nonlinear systems through a (globally) linear representation. In general, the operator is infinite-dimensional - necessitating finite approximations - for which there is no overarching framework.…
We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about…
While research on iterated revision is predominant in the field of iterated belief change, the class of iterated contraction operators received more attention in recent years. In this article, we examine a non-prioritized generalisation of…
A {\it dynamic reasoning system} (DRS) is an adaptation of a conventional formal logical system that explicitly portrays reasoning as a temporal activity, with each extralogical input to the system and each inference rule application being…
As partial justification of their framework for iterated belief revision Darwiche and Pearl convincingly argued against Boutiliers natural revision and provided a prototypical revision operator that fits into their scheme. We show that the…
Several forms of iterable belief change exist, differing in the kind of change and its strength: some operators introduce formulae, others remove them; some add formulae unconditionally, others only as additions to the previous beliefs;…
In this paper we introduce a nonmonotonic framework for belief revision in which reasoning about the reliability of different pieces of information based on meta-knowledge about the information is possible, and where revision strategies can…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper, we introduce a new framework…
We propose a method for an agent to revise its incomplete probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information is observed. In this work, an agent's beliefs are represented by a set of probabilistic formulae -- a belief base.…
Belief revision is the task of modifying a knowledge base when new information becomes available, while also respecting a number of desirable properties. Classical belief revision schemes have been already specialised to \emph{binary…
Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some…
Two level credibility-limited revision is a non-prioritized revision operation. When revising by a two level credibility-limited revision, two levels of credibility and one level of incredibility are considered. When revising by a sentence…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we…
The stability rule for belief, advocated by Leitgeb [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164, 2013], is a rule for rational acceptance that captures categorical belief in terms of $\textit{probabilistically stable propositions}$: propositions…
Humans often juggle multiple, sometimes conflicting objectives and shift their priorities as circumstances change, rather than following a fixed objective function. In contrast, most computational decision-making and multi-objective RL…