Related papers: Is Nash Equilibrium Approximator Learnable?

In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…

Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…

Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…

In stochastic Nash equilibrium problems (SNEPs), it is natural for players to be uncertain about their complex environments and have multi-dimensional unknown parameters in their models. Among various SNEPs, this paper focuses on locally…

We propose a learning-based approach for approximating solution mappings of multiparametric generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with coupling in both objectives and constraints. Rather than solving a standard regression problem on…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…

We study learnability of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) in general finite games using higher-order replicator dynamics as well as classes of higher-order uncoupled heterogeneous dynamics. In higher-order uncoupled learning dynamics,…

Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on.…

In this paper, we study the dynamic behavior of Hedge, a well-known algorithm in theoretical machine learning and algorithmic game theory. The empirical average (arithmetic mean) of the iterates Hedge generates is known to converge to a…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. While it is known that learning dynamics converge to…

We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…

In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…

Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…

In recent work of Hazan and Krauthgamer (SICOMP 2011), it was shown that finding an $\eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal value in a two-player game is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size $O(\log n)$ in the random…

In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known.…

We introduce a stochastic learning process called the dampened gradient approximation process. While learning models have almost exclusively focused on finite games, in this paper we design a learning process for games with continuous…

This paper is concerned with complexity theoretic aspects of a general formulation of quantum game theory that models strategic interactions among rational agents that process and exchange quantum information. In particular, we prove that…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…