Related papers: Risk sharing under heterogeneous beliefs without c…

We study Pareto-optimal risk sharing in economies with heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, where agents' preferences are modeled by distortion risk measures. Building on comonotonic and counter-monotonic improvement results, we show that…

We address the problem of sharing risk among agents with preferences modelled by a general class of comonotonic additive and law-based functionals that need not be either monotone or convex. Such functionals are called distortion…

We study risk sharing among agents with preferences modeled by heterogeneous distortion risk measures, who are not necessarily risk averse. Pareto optimality for agents using risk measures is often studied through the lens of…

In risk-sharing markets with aggregate uncertainty, characterizing Pareto-optimal allocations when agents might not be risk averse is a challenging task, and the literature has only provided limited explicit results thus far. In particular,…

Regulatory and contractual constraints on individual exposures are standard in insurance and reinsurance markets, but a poorly designed constraint can distort the economic incentives of risk-averse agents. In the unconstrained problem, the…

We study optimal risk sharing among $n$ agents endowed with distortion risk measures. Our model includes market frictions that can either represent linear transaction costs or risk premia charged by a clearing house for the agents. Risk…

We study Pareto optimality in a decentralized peer-to-peer risk-sharing market where agents' preferences are represented by robust distortion risk measures that are not necessarily convex. We obtain a characterization of Pareto-optimal…

The aims of this study are twofold. First, we consider an optimal risk allocation problem with non-convex preferences. By establishing an infimal representation for distortion risk measures, we give some necessary and sufficient conditions…

We study a problem of optimal allocation in a discrete-time multi-period pure-exchange economy, where agents have preferences over stochastic endowment processes that are represented by strongly time-consistent dynamic risk measures. We…

We consider the optimal risk sharing problem with a continuum of agents, modeled via a non-atomic measure space. Individual preferences are not assumed to be convex. We show the multiplicity of agents induces the value function to be…

This paper examines optimal risk sharing for empirically realistic risk attitudes, providing results on Pareto optimality, competitive equilibria, utility frontiers, and the first and second theorems of welfare. Contrary to common…

We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing in a pool of cooperative agents. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of the certainty equivalents and risk premia associated with the Pareto optimal risk sharing contract as the pool expands.…

We consider the problem of optimally sharing a financial position among agents with potentially different reference risk measures. The problem is equivalent to computing the infimal convolution of the risk metrics and finding the so-called…

This paper studies Pareto-optimal reinsurance design in a monopolistic market with multiple primary insurers and a single reinsurer, all with heterogeneous risk preferences. The risk preferences are characterized by a family of risk…

I characterize optimal government policy in a sticky-price economy with different types of consumers and endogenous financial constraints in the banking and entrepreneurial sectors. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained…

We study Pareto efficiency in a pure-exchange economy where agents' preferences are represented by risk-averse monetary utilities. These coincide with law-invariant monetary utilities, and they can be shown to correspond to the class of…

We study efficient risk sharing among risk-averse agents in an economy with a large, finite number of states. Following a random shock to an initial agreement, agents may renegotiate. If they require a minimal utility improvement to accept…

We consider the risk sharing problem for capital requirements induced by capital adequacy tests and security markets. The agents involved in the sharing procedure may be heterogeneous in that they apply varying capital adequacy tests and…

The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…

We consider a Ramsey model with several households with heterogeneous preferences who are able to borrow capital to each other. Since the capital constraints of one household then depends on the others' capital, one can no longer optimize…