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Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…
In recent work of Hazan and Krauthgamer (SICOMP 2011), it was shown that finding an $\eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal value in a two-player game is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size $O(\log n)$ in the random…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with strongly monotone pseudo-gradients and jointly linear coupling constraints. We establish the convergence rate of a payoff-based approach intended to learn a variational…
We develop an octonionic representation of the payoff function for three player, two strategy, maximally entangled quantum games in order to obtain computationally friendly version of this function. This computational capability is then…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…
Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
Computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games in classical and quantum settings is extensively studied. For general-sum games, computing Nash equilibria is PPAD-hard and the computing of a more general concept called correlated equilibria has…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…
We study the problem of solving matrix games of the form $\min_{\mathbf{p}\in\Delta}\max_{\mathbf{w}\in\mathcal{W}}\mathbf{p}^{\top}A\mathbf{w}$, where $A$ is a matrix and $\Delta$ is the probability simplex. This problem encapsulates…
Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
We derive the rate of convergence to Nash equilibria for the payoff-based algorithm proposed in \cite{tat_kam_TAC}. These rates are achieved under the standard assumption of convexity of the game, strong monotonicity and differentiability…
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…
In this paper a distribution-free methodology is presented for providing robustness guarantees for Nash equilibria (NE) of multi-agent games. Leveraging recent a posteriori developments of the so called scenario approach (Campi et al.,…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
We study generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with quadratic costs and individual linear equality constraints. Departing from approaches that require strong monotonicity and/or shared constraints, we reformulate the KKT…