Related papers: Empirical Welfare Economics
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
Researchers do not know what the framers of the United States Constitution intended when they wrote of the general Welfare. Nevertheless, economists can conjecture by specifying social welfare functions that aim to express the preferences…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
Allocation of scarce healthcare resources under limited logistic and infrastructural facilities is a major issue in the modern society. We consider the problem of allocation of healthcare resources like vaccines to people or hospital beds…
We analyze and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two different boundedly rational (i.e., sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely, myopic…
We consider the design of mechanisms that allocate limited resources among self-interested agents using neural networks. Unlike the recent works that leverage machine learning for revenue maximization in auctions, we consider welfare…
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…
Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of agents might change and envy might arise. We study the…
A system of non-tradable credits that flow between individuals like karma, hence proposed under that name, is a mechanism for repeated resource allocation that comes with attractive efficiency and fairness properties, in theory. In this…
The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange…
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…
Most decision theories, including expected utility theory, rank dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory, assume that investors are only interested in the distribution of returns and not in the states of the economy in which…
Consider a causal structure with endogeneity (i.e., unobserved confoundedness) in empirical data, where an instrumental variable is available. In this setting, we show that the mean social welfare function can be identified and represented…
Machine learning is increasingly used in government programs to identify and support the most vulnerable individuals, prioritizing assistance for those at greatest risk over optimizing aggregate outcomes. This paper examines the welfare…
In prediction-based decision-making systems, different perspectives can be at odds: The short-term business goals of the decision makers are often in conflict with the decision subjects' wish to be treated fairly. Balancing these two…
Economies and societal structures in general are complex stochastic systems which may not lend themselves well to algebraic analysis. An addition of subjective value criteria to the mechanics of interacting agents will further complicate…
Communication or influence networks are probably the most controllable of all factors that are known to impact on the problem-solving capability of task-forces. In the case connections are costly, it is necessary to implement a policy to…
We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…