Related papers: A Heterogeneous Schelling Model for Wealth Dispari…
The Schelling model has become a paradigm in social sciences to explain the emerge of residential spatial segregation even in the presence of high tolerance to mixed neighborhoods by the side of citizens. In particular, we consider a noisy…
In his 1971's Dynamic Models of Segregation paper, the economist Thomas C. Schelling showed that a small preference for one's neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total segregation, even if total segregation does not correspond…
We propose an equilibrium interaction model of occupational segregation and labor market inequality between two social groups, generated exclusively through the documented tendency to refer informal job seekers of identical "social color".…
Thomas Schelling proposed an influential simple spatial model to illustrate how, even with relatively mild assumptions on each individual's nearest neighbor preferences, an integrated city would likely unravel to a segregated city, even if…
We study the impact of economic integration on agglomeration in a model where all consumers are inter-regionally mobile and have heterogeneous preferences regarding their residential location choices. This heterogeneity is the unique…
We propose a metapopulation version of the Schelling model where two kinds of agents relocate themselves, with unconstrained destination, if their local fitness is lower than a tolerance threshold. We show that, for small values of the…
Residential segregation is analyzed via the Schelling model, in which two types of agents attempt to optimize their situation according to certain preferences and tolerance levels. Several variants of this work are focused on urban or…
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…
The Schelling model of segregation looks to explain the way in which a population of agents or particles of two types may come to organise itself into large homogeneous clusters, and can be seen as a variant of the Ising model in which the…
Schelling games use a game-theoretic approach to study the phenomenon of residential segregation as originally modeled by Schelling. Inspired by the recent increase in the number of people and businesses preferring and promoting diversity,…
We study a system of $N$ agents, whose wealth grows linearly, under the effect of stochastic resetting and interacting via a tax-like dynamics -- all agents donate a part of their wealth, which is, in turn, redistributed equally among all…
This paper generalizes the original Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 2006) model of racial and residential segregation to a context of variable externalities due to social linkages. In a setting in which individuals' utility function is a convex…
Homophily and heterophobia, the tendency for people with similar characteristics to preferentially interact with (or avoid) each other are pervasive in human social networks. Here, we develop an extension of the mathematical theory of urban…
The phenomenon of residential segregation was captured by Schelling's famous segregation model where two types of agents are placed on a grid and an agent is content with her location if the fraction of her neighbors which have the same…
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the…
We consider a Schelling-like segregation model, in which the behavior of individual agents is determined by a mixed individual and global utility. With a high ratio of global utility being incorporated, the agents are cooperative in order…
Contrary to the widely believed hypothesis that larger, denser cities promote socioeconomic mixing, a recent study (Nilforoshan et al. 2023) reports the opposite behavior, i.e. more segregation. Here, we present a game-theoretic model that…
Societies are complex. Properties of social systems can be explained by the interplay and weaving of individual actions. Incentives are key to understand people's choices and decisions. For instance, individual preferences of where to live…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
Thomas Schelling developed an influential demographic model that illustrated how, even with relatively mild assumptions on each individual's nearest neighbor preferences, an integrated city would likely unravel to a segregated city, even if…