Related papers: Stable Voting
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
We present a silent, self-stabilizing ranking protocol for the population protocol model of distributed computing, where agents interact in randomly chosen pairs to solve a common task. We are given $n$ anonymous agents, and the goal is to…
Voting power determines the "power" of individuals who cast votes; their power is based on their ability to influence the winning-ness of a coalition. Usually each individual acts alone, casting either all or none of their votes and is…
In variable or graph selection problems, finding a right-sized model or controlling the number of false positives is notoriously difficult. Recently, a meta-algorithm called Stability Selection was proposed that can provide reliable…
Instant runoff voting (IRV) has recently gained popularity as an alternative to plurality voting for political elections, with advocates claiming a range of advantages, including that it produces more moderate winners than plurality and…
We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…
The formation and stability of social hierarchies is a question of general relevance. Here, we propose a simple generalized theoretical model for establishing social hierarchy via pair-wise interactions between individuals and investigate…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
In this paper a new multi-candidate electronic voting scheme is constructed with unlimited participants. The main idea is to express a ballot to allow voting for up to k out of the m candidates and unlimited participants. The purpose of…
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…
In voting contexts, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number $k$ of new candidates will be added. We…
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction scenario, a…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…
How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? Building on the work of Aragones et al. (2007), I study how…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
Various voting rules are based on ranking the candidates by scores induced by aggregating voter preferences. A winner (respectively, unique winner) is a candidate who receives a score not smaller than (respectively, strictly greater than)…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…