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This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. The presence of ties…
In this paper, we consider a Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics. Different from existing results for single integrators, we aim to steer the outputs of this class of…
In non-truthful auctions such as first-price and all-pay auctions, the independent strategic behaviors of bidders, with the corresponding Bayes-Nash equilibrium notion, are notoriously difficult to characterize and can cause undesirable…
We consider an augmented version of Merton's portfolio choice problem, where trading by large investors influences the price of underlying financial asset leading to strategic interaction among investors, with investors deciding their…
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make the allocation and payment decisions…
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications when agents with non-linear (specifically, convex) disutility…
This paper explores the design of contests involving $n$ contestants, focusing on how the designer decides on the number of contestants allowed and the prize structure with a fixed budget. We characterize the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We present a simple dynamic equilibrium model for an online exchange where both buyers and sellers arrive according to a exogenously defined stochastic process. The structure of this exchange is motivated by the limit order book mechanism…
Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…
We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…
The internet advertising market is a multi-billion dollar industry, in which advertisers buy thousands of ad placements every day by repeatedly participating in auctions. An important and ubiquitous feature of these auctions is the presence…
This paper explores the gain maximization problem of two nations engaging in non-cooperative bilateral trade. Probabilistic model of an exchange of commodities under different price systems is considered. Volume of commodities exchanged…
This paper studies the equilibrium price of an asset that is traded in continuous time between N agents who have heterogeneous beliefs about the state process underlying the asset's payoff. We propose a tractable model where agents maximize…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest…
This paper examines whether widely used online learning algorithms in pricing can independently reach competitive outcomes or instead foster tacit collusion. This issue has drawn considerable attention from competition regulators as…
We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…