Related papers: Mitigating Power Attacks through Fine-Grained Inst…

Fault injection attacks represent a class of threats that can compromise embedded systems across multiple layers of abstraction, such as system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical implementation.…

New speculation-based attacks that affect large numbers of modern systems are disclosed regularly. Currently, CPU vendors regularly fall back to heavy-handed mitigations like using barriers or enforcing strict programming guidelines…

Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptographic implementations, particularly for small devices that are under the physical control of the adversary. While several strategies for protecting against side-channel…

In the last years, a series of side channels have been discovered on CPUs. These side channels have been used in powerful attacks, e.g., on cryptographic implementations, or as building blocks in transient-execution attacks such as Spectre…

Micro-architectural attacks use information leaked through shared resources to break hardware-enforced isolation. These attacks have been used to steal private information ranging from cryptographic keys to privileged Operating System (OS)…

With the outsourcing of design flow, ensuring the security and trustworthiness of integrated circuits has become more challenging. Among the security threats, IC counterfeiting and recycled ICs have received a lot of attention due to their…

We propose using reinforcement learning to address the challenges of discovering microarchitectural vulnerabilities, such as Spectre and Meltdown, which exploit subtle interactions in modern processors. Traditional methods like random…

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…

Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel.…

Side-channel attacks are an unpredictable risk factor in cryptography. Therefore, continuous observations of physical leakages are essential to minimise vulnerabilities associated with cryptographic functions. Lightweight cryptography is a…

With the ever-increasing reliance on data for data-driven applications in power grids, such as event cause analysis, the authenticity of data streams has become crucially important. The data can be prone to adversarial stealthy attacks…

Decentralised post-training of large language models utilises data and pipeline parallelism techniques to split the data and the model. Unfortunately, decentralised post-training can be vulnerable to poisoning and backdoor attacks by one or…

Compression algorithms are widely used as they save memory without losing data. However, elimination of redundant symbols and sequences in data leads to a compression side channel. So far, compression attacks have only focused on the…

Caches have become the prime method for unintended information extraction across logical isolation boundaries. Even Spectre and Meltdown rely on the cache side channel, as it provides great resolution and is widely available on all major…

Power side channel is a very important category of side channels, which can be exploited to steal confidential information from a computing system by analyzing its power consumption. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of various…

Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…

We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of…

We consider time synchronization attack against multi-system scheduling in a remote state estimation scenario where a number of sensors monitor different linear dynamical processes and schedule their transmissions through a shared collision…

Timing side channels pose a significant threat to the security and privacy of software applications. We propose an approach for mitigating this problem by decreasing the strength of the side channels as measured by entropy-based objectives,…

Spectre intrusions exploit speculative execution design vulnerabilities in modern processors. The attacks violate the principles of isolation in programs to gain unauthorized private user information. Current state-of-the-art detection…