Related papers: Rational Verification for Probabilistic Systems
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
Runtime verification encompasses several lightweight techniques for checking whether a system's current execution satisfies a given specification. We focus on runtime verification for Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Previous work describes…
This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In…
Model checking of strategic abilities is a notoriously hard problem, even more so in the realistic case of agents with imperfect information, acting in a stochastic environment. Assume-guarantee reasoning can be of great help here,…
We study the rational verification problem which consists in verifying the correctness of a system executing in an environment that is assumed to behave rationally. We consider the model of rationality in which the environment only executes…
Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games…
Strategy Logic (SL) is a very expressive logic for specifying and verifying properties of multi-agent systems: in SL, one can quantify over strategies, assign them to agents, and express properties of the resulting plays. Such a powerful…
Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of…
Stochastic multi-agent systems are a central modeling framework for autonomous controllers, communication protocols, and cyber-physical infrastructures. In many such systems, however, transition probabilities are only estimated from data…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
We introduce a method to verify stochastic reinforcement learning (RL) policies. This approach is compatible with any RL algorithm as long as the algorithm and its corresponding environment collectively adhere to the Markov property. In…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Most autonomous robotic agents use logic inference to keep themselves to safe and permitted behaviour. Given a set of rules, it is important that the robot is able to establish the consistency between its rules, its perception-based…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are notoriously complex and hard to verify. In fact, it is not trivial to model a MAS, and even when a model is built, it is not always possible to verify, in a formal way, that it is actually behaving as we…
The satisfiability problem for branching-time temporal logics like CTL*, CTL and CTL+ has important applications in program specification and verification. Their computational complexities are known: CTL* and CTL+ are complete for doubly…
Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy…