Related papers: Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian …
At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…
This paper studies the limits of empirical means of open-loop Nash equilibria of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games as the number of players goes to infinity, when the corresponding mean field game is of potential type and may…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
We extend the optimin notion of Ismail (2025) from mixed strategy profiles to correlated distributions. A correlated distribution is evaluated by the worst expected payoff each player can receive when opponents may either obey their private…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
In this paper, we consider a large class of constrained non-cooperative stochastic Markov games with countable state spaces and discounted cost criteria. In one-player case, i.e., constrained discounted Markov decision models, it is…
We introduce Mean Field Markov games with $N$ players, in which each individual in a large population interacts with other randomly selected players. The states and actions of each player in an interaction together determine the…
In this paper, we study which data can be induced by a correlated equilibrium given a known finite simultaneous move game. We assume that an analyst has access to the frequency of each agent's actions but does not have access to the…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…
Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium…
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum. In…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…