Related papers: Approximating Equilibrium under Constrained Piecew…
We study the problem of computing approximate market equilibria in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. In this setting, the problem was only known to be PPAD-complete for inverse-polynomial…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant…
We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization…
We prove that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-complete even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utility functions. In fact, our proof shows that this market-equilibrium…
Market equilibrium is a solution concept with many applications such as digital ad markets, fair division, and resource sharing. For many classes of utility functions, equilibria can be captured by convex programs. We develop simple…
We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, meaning that every buyer receives a $(1-\delta)$-optimal…
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a model for competition in markets where each firm offers a schedule of prices and quantities to face demand uncertainty, and has been successfully applied to wholesale electricity markets. However,…
It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium in Fisher's spending model is easier than computing a market equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu's exchange model. This belief is built on the fact that we have more algorithmic success in…
Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we…
Electricity market operators worldwide use mixed-integer linear programming to solve the allocation problem in wholesale electricity markets. Prices are typically determined based on the duals of relaxed versions of this optimization…
Large-scale competitive market equilibrium problems arise in a wide range of important applications, including economic decision-making and intelligent manufacturing. Traditional solution methods, such as interior-point algorithms and…
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…
Motivated by the convergence result of mirror-descent algorithms to market equilibria in linear Fisher markets, it is natural for one to consider designing dynamics (specifically, iterative algorithms) for agents to arrive at linear…
A major goal in Algorithmic Game Theory is to justify equilibrium concepts from an algorithmic and complexity perspective. One appealing approach is to identify natural distributed algorithms that converge quickly to an equilibrium. This…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
Competitive equilibrium is a central concept in economics with numerous applications beyond markets, such as scheduling, fair allocation of goods, or bandwidth distribution in networks. Computation of competitive equilibria has received a…
Computing market equilibria is a problem of both theoretical and applied interest. Much research to date focuses on the case of static Fisher markets with full information on buyers' utility functions and item supplies. Motivated by…