Related papers: Robust Clearing Price Mechanisms for Reserve Price…

We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. \citet{kolumbus2022auctions} showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders participate in second-price auctions using no-regret bidding…

We study the market design of keep-alive caching policies applicable in serverless computing. Prior work has assumed that the cost of a cache miss (cold start) is uniform across all customer applications. However, the cost of a cache miss…

We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing advertising slots on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a general problem formulation which allows the privately known valuation per click to be a…

In many online advertisement (ad) exchanges, ad slots are each sold via a separate second-price auction. This paper considers the bidder's problem of maximizing the value of ads they purchase in these auctions, subject to budget…

We study offline dynamic pricing when historical data provide incomplete coverage of the price space such that some candidate prices, including the optimal one, may be entirely unobserved. This setting is common in practice and is…

Bid shading has become a standard practice in the digital advertising industry, in which most auctions for advertising (ad) opportunities are now of first price type. Given an ad opportunity, performing bid shading requires estimating not…

This paper explores the integration of strategic optimization methods in search advertising, focusing on ad ranking and bidding mechanisms within E-commerce platforms. By employing a combination of reinforcement learning and evolutionary…

We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in…

Modern content platforms offer paid promotion to mitigate cold start by allocating exposure via auctions. Our empirical analysis reveals a counterintuitive flaw in this paradigm: while promotion rescues low-to-medium quality content, it can…

Posted price mechanisms are prevalent in allocating goods within online marketplaces due to their simplicity and practical efficiency. We explore a fundamental scenario where buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed,…

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to…

The increasing penetration of renewable energy in recent years has led to more uncertainties in power systems. In order to maintain system reliability and security, electricity market operators need to keep certain reserves in the…

As data marketplaces become increasingly central to the digital economy, it is crucial to design efficient pricing mechanisms that optimize revenue while ensuring fair and adaptive pricing. We introduce the Maximum Auction-to-Posted Price…

The growing integration of renewable energy sources necessitates adequate reserve capacity to maintain power balance. However, in market clearing, power companies with flexible resources may submit strategic bids to maximize profits,…

We study the problem of computing data-driven personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions without having any assumption on valuation distributions. Here, the input is a data-set that contains the submitted bids of $n$ buyers…

Designing truthful, revenue maximizing auctions is a core problem of auction design. Multi-item settings have long been elusive. Recent work (arXiv:1706.03459) introduces effective deep learning techniques to find such auctions for the…

First-price auctions have very recently swept the online advertising industry, replacing second-price auctions as the predominant auction mechanism on many platforms. This shift has brought forth important challenges for a bidder: how…

I consider a mechanism design problem of selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has minimal amount of information. I assume that the designer only knows the upper bounds of bidders' values for each good and has no…

Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing…

We consider job scheduling settings, with multiple machines, where jobs arrive online and choose a machine selfishly so as to minimize their cost. Our objective is the classic makespan minimization objective, which corresponds to the…