Related papers: The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem wit…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
An input to the Popular Matching problem, in the roommates setting, consists of a graph $G$ and each vertex ranks its neighbors in strict order, known as its preference. In the Popular Matching problem the objective is to test whether there…
We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
We investigate the Euclidean $d$-Dimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set~$V$ of $d \cdot n$ points from the 2-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into $n$ disjoint (unordered) subsets…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…