Related papers: A Network Approach to Public Goods: A Short Summar…
Spatial networks, in which nodes and edges are embedded in space, play a vital role in the study of complex systems. For example, many social networks attach geo-location information to each user, allowing the study of not only topological…
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…
Solutions to multi-objective optimization problems can generally not be compared or ordered, due to the lack of orderability of the single objectives. Furthermore, decision-makers are often made to believe that scaled objectives can be…
The efficient use of available resources is a key factor in achieving success on both personal and organizational levels. One of the crucial resources in knowledge economy is time. The ability to force others to adapt to our schedule even…
In settings where players have a limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better…
We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over an undirected network of agents, where only those agents connected by an edge can directly communicate. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific…
Competitive interactions represent one of the driving forces behind evolution and natural selection in biological and sociological systems. For example, animals in an ecosystem may vie for food or mates; in a market economy, firms may…
We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
We introduce a heterogeneous connection model for network formation to capture the effect of cost heterogeneity on the structure of efficient networks. In the proposed model, connection costs are assumed to be separable, which means the…
Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their…
Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not…
This study proposes a novel functional vector autoregressive framework for analyzing network interactions of functional outcomes in panel data settings. In this framework, an individual's outcome function is influenced by the outcomes of…
In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…
High-centrality nodes have disproportionate influence on the behavior of a network; therefore controlling such nodes can efficiently steer the system to a desired state. Existing multiplex centrality measures typically rank nodes assuming…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…
Despite their promise, fair machine learning methods often yield Pareto-inefficient models, in which the performance of certain groups can be improved without degrading that of others. This issue arises frequently in traditional…
We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care which house or resource they get but also care about who gets…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
In this paper, we consider distributed optimization problems over a multi-agent network, where each agent can only partially evaluate the objective function, and it is allowed to exchange messages with its immediate neighbors. Differently…