Related papers: Deterministic Differential Games in Infinite Horiz…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…
It is well known that the (unique) value of a stochastic control problem or a two person zero sum game under Isaacs condition can be characterized through a PDE driven by the Hamiltonian. Our goal of this paper is to extend this classical…
We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…
We study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, on a finite time horizon. The objective of each player is to maximize her total expected discounted profits. The resolution methodology relies…
The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…
We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) associated with the time inhomogeneous singular control problem is a parabolic partial differential equation, and the existence of a classical solution is usually difficult to prove. In this paper,…
In this paper, we focus on the stochastic representation of a system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJB-Isaacs (HJBI), for short) equations which is in fact a system of coupled Isaacs' type integral-partial differential…
In many multi-player interactions, players incur strictly positive costs each time they execute actions e.g. 'menu costs' or transaction costs in financial systems. Since acting at each available opportunity would accumulate prohibitively…
In the present work, we study deterministic mean field games (MFGs) with finite time horizon in which the dynamics of a generic agent is controlled by the acceleration. They are described by a system of PDEs coupling a continuity equation…
Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. We assume that the…
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing…
In this paper we study the zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games with not assuming Isaacs condition. Along with the partition $\pi$ of the time interval $[0,T]$, we choose the suitable random non-anticipative strategy with delay to…
In this paper we investigate zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are given by doubly controlled reflected backward stochastic differential equations (RBSDEs) with two barriers. For admissible controls…
We study zero-sum stochastic differential games with player dynamics governed by a nondegenerate controlled diffusion process. Under the assumption of uniform stability, we establish the existence of a solution to the Isaac's equation for…
A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…
We consider impulse control problems in finite horizon for diffusions with decision lag and execution delay. The new feature is that our general framework deals with the important case when several consecutive orders may be decided before…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
The purpose of this paper is to study 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games, in which one player is a major one and the other player is a group of $N$ minor agents which are collectively playing, statistically identical and have…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…