Related papers: An Approximation Algorithm for Maximum Stable Matc…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online…
We consider the problem of maximizing a non-negative submodular function under the $b$-matching constraint, in the semi-streaming model. When the function is linear, monotone, and non-monotone, we obtain the approximation ratios of…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
Correspondence is a ubiquitous problem in computer vision and graph matching has been a natural way to formalize correspondence as an optimization problem. Recently, graph matching solvers have included higher-order terms representing…
We consider the precedence-constrained scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time. For a single machine several $2$-approximation algorithms are known, which are based on linear programming and network flows. We show…
We consider a model for repeated stochastic matching where compatibility is probabilistic, is realized the first time agents are matched, and persists in the future. Such a model has applications in the gig economy, kidney exchange, and…
We study a continuous-time, infinite-horizon dynamic bipartite matching problem. Suppliers arrive according to a Poisson process; while waiting, they may abandon the queue at a uniform rate. Customers on the other hand must be matched upon…
Matching problems under uncertainty arise in applications such as kidney exchange, hiring, and online marketplaces. A decision-maker must sequentially explore potential matches under local exploration constraints, while committing…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
For a graph $G$ define the parameters $\ell(G)$ and $L(G)$ as the minimum and maximum value of $\nu(G\backslash F)$, where $F$ is a maximum matching of $G$ and $\nu(G)$ is the matching number of $G$. In this paper, we show that there is a…
This paper considers an optimization problem for a dynamical system whose evolution depends on a collection of binary decision variables. We develop scalable approximation algorithms with provable suboptimality bounds to provide…
We consider the Max-$3$-Section problem, where we are given an undirected graph $ G=(V,E)$ equipped with non-negative edge weights $w :E\rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and the goal is to find a partition of $V$ into three equisized parts while…
Finding a maximum-cardinality or maximum-weight matching in (edge-weighted) undirected graphs is among the most prominent problems of algorithmic graph theory. For $n$-vertex and $m$-edge graphs, the best known algorithms run in…
We study adaptive two-sided assortment optimization for revenue maximization in choice-based matching platforms. The platform has two sides of agents, an initiating side, and a responding side. The decision-maker sequentially selects agents…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…