Related papers: Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information
In a setting where $m$ items need to be partitioned among $n$ agents, we evaluate the performance of mechanisms that take as input each agent's \emph{ordinal preferences}, i.e., their ranking of the items from most- to least-preferred. The…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where $n$ voters are partitioned into $k$ groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
We consider committee election of $k \geq 2$ (out of $m \geq k+1$) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's cardinal preferences over candidates correspond to her distance…
We study social choice rules under the utilitarian distortion framework, with an additional metric assumption on the agents' costs over the alternatives. In this approach, these costs are given by an underlying metric on the set of all…
We study deliberative social choice, where voters engage in small-group discussions to output collective preferences that are then aggregated by a social choice rule. We introduce a simple deliberation-via-matching protocol. In this…
We consider the distributed single-winner metric voting problem on a line, where agents and alternative are represented by points on the line of real numbers, the agents are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a…
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to…
We revisit the recent breakthrough result of Gkatzelis et al. on (single-winner) metric voting, which showed that the optimal distortion of 3 can be achieved by a mechanism called Plurality Matching. The rule picks an arbitrary candidate…
In the metric distortion problem, a set of voters and candidates lie in a common metric space, and a committee of $k$ candidates must be elected. The objective is to minimize a social cost, defined as a function of the distances between…
In the single winner determination problem, we have n voters and m candidates and each voter j incurs a cost c(i, j) if candidate i is chosen. Our objective is to choose a candidate that minimizes the expected total cost incurred by the…
We study low sample complexity mechanisms in participatory budgeting (PB), where each voter votes for a preferred allocation of funds to various projects, subject to project costs and total spending constraints. We analyze the distortion…
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates $C$ and voters $V$ in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of distances of the selected candidate from all the voters, and…
We consider a social choice setting with agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups, and have metric preferences over a set of alternatives. Our goal is to choose a single alternative aiming to optimize various objectives that are…
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…
We study higher statistical moments of Distortion for randomized social choice in a metric implicit utilitarian model. The Distortion of a social choice mechanism is the expected approximation factor with respect to the optimal utilitarian…
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
The utilitarian distortion framework evaluates voting rules by their worst-case efficiency loss when voters have cardinal utilities but express only ordinal rankings. Under the classical model, a longstanding tension exists: Plurality,…
We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates based on voters' ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a…