Related papers: An efficient and secure scheme of verifiable compu…
Searchable encryption (SE) is one of the key enablers for building encrypted databases. It allows a cloud server to search over encrypted data without decryption. Dynamic SE additionally includes data addition and deletion operations to…
We explore the use of SGX enclaves as a means to improve the security of handling keys and data in storage systems. We study two main configurations for SGX computations, as they apply to performing data-at-rest encryption in a storage…
Application security traditionally strongly relies upon security of the underlying operating system. However, operating systems often fall victim to software attacks, compromising security of applications as well. To overcome this…
Since its debut, SGX has been used in many applications, e.g., secure data processing. However, previous systems usually assume a trusted enclave and ignore the security issues caused by an untrusted enclave. For instance, a vulnerable (or…
Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…
Software-based approaches for search over encrypted data are still either challenged by lack of proper, low-leakage encryption or slow performance. Existing hardware-based approaches do not scale well due to hardware limitations and…
The big data industry is facing new challenges as concerns about privacy leakage soar. One of the remedies to privacy breach incidents is to encapsulate computations over sensitive data within hardware-assisted Trusted Execution…
The Internet of Things (IoT) field has gained much attention from industry and academia, being the main subject for numerous research and development projects. Frequently, the dense amount of generated data from IoT applications is sent to…
Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…
Encrypted databases have been studied for more than 10 years and are quickly emerging as a critical technology for the cloud. The current state of the art is to use property-preserving encrypting techniques (e.g., deterministic encryption)…
Many applications benefit from computations over the data of multiple users while preserving confidentiality. We present a solution where multiple mutually distrusting users' data can be aggregated with an acceptable overhead, while…
Trusted execution environments (TEE) such as Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX) have been widely studied to boost security and privacy protection for the computation of sensitive data such as human genomics. However, a performance…
With the evolution of computer systems, the amount of sensitive data to be stored as well as the number of threats on these data grow up, making the data confidentiality increasingly important to computer users. Currently, with devices…
Intel SGX Guard eXtensions (SGX), a hardware-supported trusted execution environment (TEE), is designed to protect security-sensitive applications. However, since enclave applications are developed with memory unsafe languages such as…
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this…
Encrypting data before sending it to the cloud protects it against hackers and malicious insiders, but requires the cloud to compute on encrypted data. Trusted (hardware) modules, e.g., secure enclaves like Intel's SGX, can very efficiently…
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…
Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…
The latest generation of Intel processors supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX), a set of instructions that implements a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) right inside the CPU, by means of so-called enclaves. This paper presents…