Related papers: Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in firs…

With the increasing use of auctions in online advertising, there has been a large effort to study seller revenue maximization, following Myerson's seminal work, both theoretically and practically. We take the point of view of the buyer in…

Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that is considered to have advantages over the traditional decision theoretic and game theoretic approaches. ARA solutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found…

We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst case ratio between the…

We study the question of setting and testing reserve prices in single item auctions when the bidders are not identical. At a high level, there are two generalizations of the standard second price auction: in the lazy version we first…

Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…

We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…

Motivated by practical concerns in the online advertising industry, we study a bidder subset selection problem in single-item auctions. In this problem, a large pool of candidate bidders have independent values sampled from known prior…

In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…

A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid.…

We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a complete information environment, that even though these…

We consider inference on the probability density of valuations in the first-price sealed-bid auctions model within the independent private value paradigm. We show the asymptotic normality of the two-step nonparametric estimator of Guerre,…

We propose nonparametric estimators for conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) and conditional expected shortfall (CES) associated with conditional distributions of a series of returns on a financial asset. The return series and the conditioning…

We consider settings where data are available on a nonparametric function and various partial derivatives. Such circumstances arise in practice, for example in the joint estimation of cost and input functions in economics. We show that when…

We introduce an offline nonparametric estimator for concave multi-asset propagator models based on a dataset of correlated price trajectories and metaorders. Compared to parametric models, our framework avoids parameter explosion in the…

In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…

A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This…

Counterfactual estimators are critical for learning and refining policies using logged data, a process known as Off-Policy Evaluation (OPE). OPE allows researchers to assess new policies without costly experiments, speeding up the…

We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and…

This paper investigates the bias and the weak Bahadur representation of a local polynomial estimator of the conditional quantile function and its derivatives. The bias and Bahadur remainder term are studied uniformly with respect to the…

First-price auctions are one of the most popular mechanisms for selling goods and services, with applications ranging from display advertising to timber sales. Unlike their close cousin, the second-price auction, first-price auctions do not…