Related papers: Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability for Lower-Quot…
We consider constraint satisfaction problems parameterized above or below tight bounds. One example is MaxSat parameterized above $m/2$: given a CNF formula $F$ with $m$ clauses, decide whether there is a truth assignment that satisfies at…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the…
We propose a numerical algorithm for computing approximately optimal solutions of the matching for teams problem. Our algorithm is efficient for problems involving large number of agent categories and allows for non-discrete agent type…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We consider the problem of allocating a distribution of items to $n$ recipients where each recipient has to be allocated a fixed, prespecified fraction of all items, while ensuring that each recipient does not experience too much envy. We…
In this paper, we study the maximum entropy sampling problem (MESP) and its variants. MESP seeks to identify a small subset of variables that maximizes the determinant of a covariance submatrix, and is a fundamental model in optimal…
Consider a switched queueing network with general routing among its queues. The MaxWeight policy assigns available service by maximizing the objective function $\sum_j Q_j \sigma_j$ among the different feasible service options, where $Q_j$…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods,…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…
One way to define the Matching Cut problem is: Given a graph $G$, is there an edge-cut $M$ of $G$ such that $M$ is an independent set in the line graph of $G$? We propose the more general Conflict-Free Cut problem: Together with the graph…
We study a novel problem of fairness in ranking aimed at minimizing the amount of individual unfairness introduced when enforcing group-fairness constraints. Our proposal is rooted in the distributional maxmin fairness theory, which uses…
The online bipartite matching problem, extensively studied in the literature, deals with the allocation of online arriving vertices (items) to a predetermined set of offline vertices (agents). However, little attention has been given to the…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
We study fair division of indivisible mixed manna when agents have unequal entitlements, with weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1) as our primary notion of fairness. We identify several shortcomings of existing techniques to achieve…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…